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Given the limited resources available to the government institutions, value for money in procurement is crucial 
to ensuring the optimal use of finite budgetary resources. This study delves into contract package as an 
antecedent of value for money; competitive procurement as a mediating role. Fifty-three (53) pre-university 
educational institutions in the Eastern region of Ghana were selected for the study. Two research objectives 
were examined whilst two research hypotheses were tested. This study is a quantitative one, which employed 
purposive and simple random sampling techniques. Using the Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) and 
Structural Equation Model (SEM) for data analysis, the study found no relationship between contract package 
and value for money. Again, the study revealed that competitive procurement failed to exert significant effect or 
influence on contract package and value for money linkages. The study recommended that appropriate 
procurement process at the public sector is highly required to generate wealth, enhance transparency and 
accountability, encourage consistent procurement procedures and lessen corruption. Through this, value for 
money can be achieved.  
Keywords: Contract Package; Competitive Procurement; Value for Money; Pre-university Educational 
Institutions. 
1. Introduction   
Procurement plays a crucial role in the delivery of government services, but efficiency is influenced by a variety 
of constraints [1].  
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Public sector procurement accounts for between 50% and 70% of total government spending, accounting for 
about 10% of Gross Domestic Products (GDP) and financial reports for about 24% of total imports [2]. A 
reform in the public sector procurement process would, without confusion, create wealth, improve transparency, 
promote transparent procurement processes and minimize corruption [2]. As an effective way to invest limited 
resources on the public sector and donor funds, relevant qualifications, competencies and experience and related 
best practices must be identified by the public procurement staff with a clear aim to gain value for money [3] 
thus showing that the procurement roles are not well-resourced and given the basic mandate and value for 
money. Reference [4-6] discussed the need for contract aggregation in the planning of the procurement strategy 
in general and left a significant information gap on its significance in the search of value for money. The Public 
Procurement (Amendment) Act 2016 (Act 914), as amended, obliges PEs to combine the needs, where possible 
in order to obtain value for money, to prevent emergencies and to use the contractual system to procure widely 
used goods and services to make the procurement process more functional, versatile and cost-effective; avoiding 
the separation of procurement, which seeks to defeat the competitive process and to incorporate the procurement 
into the spending plan, there is a woefully insufficient analysis on the impact of successful contract 
aggregation/package/lot arrangement and its relationship to competitive procurement as variables that affect the 
value for money. On 31 December 2019, the Auditor General‘s Report of Ghana reported that pre-university 
educational institutions breached the Public Procurement (Amendment) Act 2016 (Act 914), on discrimination 
against contract awards by granting contracts without the involvement of suppliers. Moreover, the Ghana Audit 
Report on pre-university institutions (2019) indicated that there was a lack of competition in the award of 
contracts as one of the key problems facing the pre-university educational institutions. The report revealed that 
three schools could not explain the cumulative payments Ghs 80,150.00 made for the procurement of goods and 
services in contravention of Rule 78 of the Public Financial Administration Regulation, 2019, the report 
underscored the breach of Section 43(1) of the Public Procurement (Amendment) 2016 (Act 914). Similarly, In 
relation to section 20 of the Legislation on Public Procurement (Amendment) Act 2016 (Act 914), eight 
institutions engaged in the non-competitive acquisition of goods, works and services to the tune of GH 
565,453.97 (Auditors General Report, 2019). Again, two heads of institutions procured goods, works and 
services well above their threshold totally, Ghs 341,895.00 in contravention of Section 18 of the Public 
Procurement Act, 2003 (Act 663) as amended by Section 6 of the Public Procurement Act, 2016. In addition, 
some other schools failed to prepare a procurement plan for their procurement activities for the 2019 fiscal year 
but did procure items involving a total amount of GH of 61,872.00. Contrary to Part III of Act 914 of 2016 
(Section 21). Finally, Section 7 of Public Financial Management Law 2019 specifies that the Principal Spending 
Officer of the agency concerned shall approve obligations within the ceiling set by the Minister. In comparison 
to the provisions set out above, the administration of three schools spent a combined amount of Ghs 634,885.13 
on goods and services for the duration under review without an authorized budget. The lack of an approved 
procurement plan encourages unplanned procurement and non-competitive procurement. The report further 
explains that the plan will help to achieve harmonization of applications, standardization of equipment as well as 
possible economies of scale in procurement that lead to value for money (Auditor-General‘s Report, 2019). 
Notwithstanding the Government's efforts to strengthen the procurement system, the shameful discrimination 
between suppliers, contractors and consultants in goods, works and services of low quality, as detailed in the 
Ghana Auditor-General‘s Report for 2017 to 2019, is still in jeopardy. In deciding on the optimum packaging of 




the planned contracts, the PEs shall, where appropriate, aggregate procurement requests for the realization of 
value for money. Be that as it may, the inverse is now imagined in most public sector organizations that contract 
packages are designed in the interests of the authorities and subsequently awarded to some incompetent 
contractors who, by questionable means, discover their routes to the public procurement net and misuse state 
reserves for the sake of contact deals through sole or single-source procurement and breach of public 
procurement.  
1.1 Effect of Contract Package on Value for money  
In order for each financial year to anticipate its yearly requirements and to approximate procurement costs that 
will enable it to link its budget with public funding costs, each contracting entity shall be responsible for the 
planning of its purchase requirements for each financial year. Section 21 of the Public Procurement 
(Amendment) Act 2016 (Act 914) obliges PEs to combine their conditions to obtain value for money, prevent 
emergency procurement, and use system contracts in procurement, quality and consistency and cost-
effectiveness in the procurement process for widely used products and services to avoid separating. Basheka 
(2008) argued that the aggregation of requirements takes into account the market structure of the items 
requested, a similar nature of the items likely to attract the same potential bidders. Strategies for aggregate 
purchases may directly or indirectly benefit public tenderers, contracting authorities and taxpayers. Strategies 
for aggregate purchases generate positive effects in the awarding of public contracts over the competition 
process. These are achieved by encouraging competition among operators, lowering purchase prices, 
suppressing duplicated procedures and public expenditure reduction to achieve better value for money.  The 
rationale for economics behind aggregation is based on public purchasing market power accumulation through 
the exercise of bargaining power [9] and the creation of bureaucratic economies of scale [10]. Reference [11] 
Outlines two ways of accumulating public market power, including making purchases for other contracting 
authorities by employing a single contracting authority and collaborating with public-public organizations 
through occasional joint procurement. Techniques of aggregated purchase according to [11], Generates the scale 
of bureaucratic economies as transaction costs and total tenders decrease, thus improving operational efficiency 
in centralized framework agreements or dynamic purchasing systems. In addition, aggregate purchases seek to 
maximize profits by pooling the purchasing market power of the public. In line with microeconomic theory, the 
[12] can enforce purchasing power alongside its suppliers and achieve better terms and conditions when entering 
into public contracts. This is achieved by adopting strategies for aggregated purchases. Aggregated purchases, 
according to [13,14], encourage the creation of bargaining power that is non-abusive has sound economic 
justifications. Contrarily to this, aggregate purchases tend to be inefficient if they produce monopsony effects. 
[14] concluded that effective aggregated buying strategies result in an improvement in consumer purchasing 
power, the benefits of exploiting agreements and an increase in technological expertise. From the [13,14] 
reviews, it is clear that aggregate purchases called contract packaging have a link to value for money in the 
procurement process. However, it has rarely been explored in literature. This, therefore, underscores the first 
research hypothesis that;   
H1: “Contract packaging has a positive effect on value for money” 




1.2 Effect of Competitive Procurement on value for money 
Procurement by competition is a crucial element in gaining value for money in public procurement policies 
(PPPs). According to [4], the case for VFM is made easier to explain when a competitive tender for the award of 
a PPP proposal is used. Using competitive procurement as stated [15], goods and services are delivered 
efficiently. They further elaborate on a competitive market model that integrates many markets, including 
buyers and sellers on a large scale, quality and cost of production knowledge and negotiations on an unarmed 
basis [15]. Again found out that, under these models, the economy would be a manufacturer and an allocator of 
services that would be equivalent to the public sector. Good public procurement includes a system of public 
procurement regulations, rules, practices and procedures, the encouragement of effective competition through 
procurement approaches relevant to business requirements and prospective vendors and service providers, and 
the absence of bias and favouritism in making access to procurement opportunities rational [16]. PPP may 
represent value for money if it depends on the transfer of sufficient risk, the effective design of the contract 
aggregation and competition. Procurement should still be motivated by the goal of competition, unless there are 
valid grounds not to do so. Competitive procurement continues to be the only way to achieve the best value for 
money and to demonstrate accountability and integrity. Procurement agencies must show that agreements reflect 
the pursuit of the highest offer where competition is not feasible under the circumstances. This, therefore, 
underscores the first research hypothesis that;   
H2: “Competitive procurement has a positive effect on money” 
1.3 Conceptual Model  
The conceptual framework used in this study is a synthesis of the literature on how to describe a phenomenon. It 
describes the tasks needed in the course of the report, based on prior experience of the point of view of other 
researchers and insights on the topic of the research [17]. In carrying out the study, a conceptual framework is 
developed to demonstrate the interaction between independent and dependent variables. In this analysis, value 
for money is a dependent variable and a contract package is an independent variable. Also, the model reveals the 
relationship between the mediating positions of competitive procurement. 





Source: Authors Model, 2020 
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2. Methodology  
Two-stage sampling procedures were used. At the first phase of the survey, 53 pre-university educational 
institutions were sampled purposively out of the 53 pre-university educational institutions. The level of 
procurement work carried out by this district and the activity of its procurement committee members influenced 
the selection. The second phase was a simple random sampling procedure of the members of the procurement 
committee. In all, five (5) respondents were sampled from each of the pre-university educational institutions 
totalling one hundred and five (105) sampled respondents. The questionnaire and the focus group discussion 
were used to collect the data. Approximately 68.6 percent answer rate was returned to one hundred and five 
(105) questionnaires. The study was purely quantitative. Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) was done to 
confirm appropriate variables and Structural Equation Model (SEM) was also used to draw the effect.  
3.  Final results and considerations 
3.1 Reliability and Validity  
The study used version 13 of the Stata to evaluate all the scales of the CFA in order to determine the efficiency 
and validity of the measurements. The CFA was the software to classify any problem indicators to be evaluated 
by the build. Many products were withdrawn from the models after purification because the factor was 
incorrectly loaded. As recommended by [17] the criterion was 0.4. Composite reliability was the upper limit for 
true reliability with the following values: contract package (0.829), competitive procurement (0.791) and value 
for money (0.811) as seen in Table 4.1.  The results found that all variables had a high degree of internal 
precision of reliability above the level of 0.70 [18] and thus confirmed the reliability of the variables. The 
loading factor tested the validity of the designs of the sample ([19]. As seen in Table 4.1, all things intended to 
calculate a given construction, which was heavily loaded on the construction, were assembled to be weighed, 
thereby confirming the authenticity of the pieces. Final markers have been seen in the list of items, the 
respective standardization of factor loadings and t-values, as well as the results of validity tests, indicating 
positive and relevant loadings for the convergence of the measures used in the study. The result shows that 
validity is acceptable; thus exceeding the minimum cut-off criterion [17] the average variances extracted were 
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Table 4.1: Reliability and Validity Result 
 
 Variables Factor 
Loading 










Contract package CP1 .3963142 4.66 0.790 .829 .884 .653 1.01 .4531 
CP2 .7044703 7.53       
CP3 .8497 8.23          
CP4 .8682931 6.66       
CP5 .8849222 6.97       
Competitive 
Procurement 
CPr1 .5801992 7.51 0.663 .791 .862 .717 1.01 .1673 
CPr2 .6141382 4.67       
CPr3 .7822316 8.18       
CPr4 .7934237 12.40       
CPr5 8434672 12.97       
Value for Money VfM1 .3061554    3.76 0.798 .811 .893 .792 1.01 .5487 
VfM2 -.991840    -94.21       
VfM3 -.949993    -71.69       
VfM4 -.824227     -27.91          
VfM5 -.716568   -9.99       
VfM6 -.960729    -12.56       
VfM7 -.4850207    -5.83       
VfM8 -.5873647 -6.354       
VfM9 -.7475832        




3.2 Correlation Matrix  







VIF AVE Highest  
correlation 
Contract Package 1   1.01 .653 .4531 
Competitive 
procurement 
0.0516* 1  1.01 .717 .1673 
Value for Money 0.0516* 0.0300* 1 1.01 .792 .5487 
Source: Field Survey, 2020 
A multicollinearity test was conducted using Variance inflation factor (VIF) and correlation statistics to 
determine if the frequency of relationship between the variables determines further statistical analysis. In the 
case of hardness, it is suggested that the VIF be below 10, while the correlation figures do not exceed 0.7. [21 & 
22]. As seen in Table 4.2, all variables were within the spectrum shown in the literature, except for the 
relationship between them. However, the Average Variance explained (AVE) is higher than the full correlation 
which implies that the variables are ideal for research purposes. 
3.3 Effect of Contract package on Value for Money 
Table 4.3: Effect of Contract package on value for money 
Independent Variables Coefficient. OIM  
std. err 
Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Contract package 0.1312923 0.2525561 0.432 0.482 -.3600921 0.6345581 
Dependent variable: Value for Money 
Source: Field Survey, 2020 
The first objective of the study is to determine the effect of the contract package on value for money. Compared 
to Table 4.3 the result reveals that the contract package's coefficient value is 0.1312923, which indicates a 
positive impact on value for money effect. However, the contract package is statistically insignificant and the 
predictor does not make any special contribution to the value-for-money projection with a P-value of 0.432 and 
a Z-value of 0.482. This therefore suggest that contract package design fail to follow the required procedures 
underpinning the Public Procurement Amendment Act 2016 (Act 914) resulting flaws within procurement 
systems at the selected pre-university institutions. This is therefore congruence within the indication by OECD 
(2009) in accordance with microeconomic theory, are able to enforce buyer power alongside its suppliers and 




achieve better terms and conditions when entering into public contracts. This is obtained by adopting strategies 
for aggregated purchasing.  Aggregated purchasing, according to OECD (2009) and CHEN (2007) fosters the 
creation of bargaining power that is non-abusive has sound economic justifications. 
3.4  Mediating role of Competitive Procurement between Contract package and VFM 
The research assesses the mediating effects of competitive procurement or bidding on the relationship between 
the contract package and value for money. The product of the Structural Equation Model (SEM) from the direct, 
indirect and cumulative performance effects is presented below. Several approaches for the testing of theories 
on mediation have been suggested [23]. One of the widely used strategies is the casual step technique suggested 
by [22], where the investigator calculates the paths of the model using the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 
regression or SEM, which measures the degree to which certain parameters are met. [23] proposed three 
important but not appropriate criteria that should be met to argue that mediation is taking place. For the state of 
mediation: X (Independent Variable) is strongly connected to M (Mediator); M is significantly related to Y 
(Dependent Variable). When M is in the model, the relationship between X and Y decreases. It suggested that 
each of the three construct showed signs of a non-zero monotonic relationship with one another and the relation 
between X and Y was dramatically decreased with the addition of M as the Y predictor [23]. The research 
investigated this effect using the structural equation model. Figure 4.1 indicate the model figure and result.  
 
Figure 4.1: Fitting target model: Structural Equation Model 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -517.77548   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -517.77548   
Structural equation model Number of obs     =         72 
Estimation method = ml 




Log likelihood     = -517.77548 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                              |                      OIM 
                                              |        Coef.       Std. Err.      z     P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-----------------------------       +---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Structural                               | 
  Value for Money                 | 
     Competitive Procurement |   -.066188   .4003823    -0.17   0.869    -.8509228    .7185468 
             Contract Package       |   .6214761     .44484      1.40   0.162    -.2503943     1.493346 
                       _cons               |   47.61347   15.99678     2.98   0.003     16.26036    78.96658 
  ---------------------------        +---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  Competitive Procurement     | 
             Contract Package       |   .0318968   .1308831     0.24   0.807    -.2246295     .288423 
                       _cons               |     24.981     3.674712     6.80   0.000      17.7787    32.18331 
-----------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         Var (e. Value for Money) |   38.74204   6.457007                      27.94574     53.7093 
var(e. Competitive Procurement)|3.356606   .5594344                      2.421216    4.653367 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
LR test of model vs. saturated: chi2 (0)   =      0.00, Prob > chi2 =       
The consequence of the structural equation indicates the mediating effect of competitive procurement on the 
relationship between the contract package and value for money. The result indicates the observed value of 72, 
showing the number of respondents who attended the indicators during data collection. The confidence interval 
or level was 95% while the significant level was 0.05. The result using the model coefficients and the significant 
values indicates that competitive procurement is statistically insignificant and could not impact on the 
relationship between the contract package and the value for money as shown [Coeff].= -0.066188, p = 0.869 > 




0.05]. Similarly, LR test model also confirms such indication shown as (chi2 (0) = 0.00, Prob. > chi2). This 
shows that competitive procurement fails to predict or influence contract package and value for money linkages. 
This therefore contradict the indication by Mlinga (2007), that procurement that is driven by the objective of 
procuring competitively unless there are convincing reasons not to procure in such manner has the propensity of 
exerting significant effect on value for money. This also has the propensity of mediating effectively the 
relationship between contract package and value for money. The author argued that competitive procurement 
remains the best way of achieving best value for money and demonstrating transparency and integrity on 
contract packages. 
4. Conclusion 
The results clearly demonstrate that contract package does not have an effect on money for money. It is 
suggested that the design of the contract package lacks the details required to achieve consistency. Contract 
package preparation should also be considered as a core aspect of procurement in the study area. It is important 
for the government to take a closer look at how the contract package is designed by the study area. Furthermore, 
the analysis reveals that competitive bidding does not affect the contract package and value for money linkages.  
5. Recommendations 
It is recommended that policies and strict laws should be instituted to ensure that procurement activities at pre-
university institutions comply with the Public Procurement laws and regulations of Ghana. This would make 
people desist from acts of corruption that negatively impact effectiveness, efficiency and quality of procured 
goods/services.  It is also recommended that training and seminars are done to increase the knowledge level of 
individuals who work directly with procurement activities.  
6. Limitations of the study 
The scope of the research and its subsequent collection of data were limited to the eastern region of Ghana due 
to time constraints and resource constraints. The findings are generalized to include other regions in Ghana as 
the conditions prevailing in the Eastern Region are fairly representative of the conditions prevailing in other 
regions of Ghana. However, the actual data collection from other regions may result in slightly different results. 
This research also used survey methodology that depended on the response of procurement officers to their 
organizations. There is a likelihood of bias in the respondent. However, the study to further investigate this 
discovery could not be carried out. This was due to the fact that the data obtained was biased considerably 
against public institutions, with no data originating from the private sector. 
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